WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
In one of his shareholder letters, Warren Buffett told his readers that the terms "value investing" and "growth investing" were really the same thing. He felt that a value investor should be looking for companies whose business prospects and profits appear to be on an increasing trajectory for the foreseeable future. Wall Street views growth stocks as those whose revenues and profits increase at annual rates which exceed, by a substantial amount, the average increases of those financial attributes for the general market.
Investing in stocks whose revenues and earnings are growing at a pace exceeding that of the market ("growth stocks") is a well respected investment philosophy. The most famous proponent of growth investing was Philip A. Fisher, who wrote his classic, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits in 1958. Mr. Fisher was born in 1907 and started his own money management company in 1931. He headed Fisher & Company until 1999, retiring at the age of 91. He looked for companies which devoted a large portion of their earnings to research and development of new products. He was a long term investor. His son, Kenneth Fisher, who has continued the family tradition of money management, reported that Mr. Fisher invested in Motorola in 1955 and held the stock until his death in 2004.
Philip Fisher listed 15 attributes to look for in a promising stock. He indicated that a company should provide its customers with a product or service with a potential market large enough to provide significant sales increases in future years. In addition to the product, the company also had to be able to improve on that product through continuous research and development in order to be ready to sell the new model (in today's parlance, its Version 2.0) when the current model had run its life cycle and to repeat this over and over again while also developing new products. Mr. Fisher looked for a company with a significant percentage of its sales dollars devoted to research. Not only must the product have a large market potential, but it also must be able to generate a significant profit margin for the company. He also wanted to know what steps a company was taking to protect and increase its profit margin.
In addition to these financial characteristics, Mr. Fisher was interested in a company's labor relations, the depth of its management bench, its executive development program and the quality of its expense controls. He wanted a company capable of financing its growth with earnings or debt. Mr. Fisher recognized that if the company needed to raise additional capital through stock offerings, the existing shareholders' ownership percentage was going to be diluted by the issuance of additional shares to new investors. If an investor owns 100 shares of a company which has issued 1,000 shares, he or she has a 10% interest in the company. If that company issues an additional 1,000 shares and the shareholder does not buy any additional shares, then that 100 share percentage drops from 10% to 5%.
Three management traits were of also important to Mr. Fisher. First, he wanted to find companies whose management was interested in the long term success of the company, not its next quarterly results. Second, the management had to be honest with the shareholders in the bad times as well as the good ones. He explained this as follows:
Furthermore, the companies into which the investor should be buying if greatest gains are to occur are companies which over the years will constantly, through the efforts or technical research, be trying to produce and sell new products and new processes. By the law of averages, some of these are bound to be costly failures......How a management reacts to such matters can be a valuable clue to the investor. The management that does not report as freely when things are going badly as when they are going well usually "clams up" in this way for one of several rather significant reasons. It may not have a program worked out to solve the unanticipated difficulty. It may have become panicky. It may not have an adequate sense of responsibility to its stockholders seeing no reason why it should report more than what may seem expedient at the moment. In any event, the investor will do well to exclude from investment any company that withholds or tries to hide bad news.
The third, and most important, management trait Mr. Fisher required was that the executives in charge have the utmost integrity and see themselves as stewards of the shareholders' business.
As with all forms of investing, relying solely on one concept can lead to trouble. One of the more famous examples of growth investing gone wrong is the "Nifty Fifty." This was the name given to 50 large cap stocks on the New York Stock Exchange which had consistent earnings growth during the bull market of the late 1960's and early 1970s. Unfortunately, those companies became viewed as "one decision" stocks, i.e., buy and hold them with little or no thought to their financial condition or business prospects other than their earnings growth rates. In that bull market, the P/E ratios paid for some of these stocks grew to as high as 50. Even more troubling, the P/E ratios for the companies increased at a rate far in excess of the earnings increases of the companies. As is usually the case, "Nifty Fifty" investors suffered large losses when the bottom fell out of the market later in the 1970s and prices crashed.
In order to get a full appreciation of the tenets of growth investing, an individual can do no better than to read this investment classic. The above excerpt comes from Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits republished by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. under its Wiley Investment Classics series in 1997.
Comments are welcome.
Monday, July 25, 2011
Monday, July 18, 2011
Carrett, Graham, Frank & Buffett - A Reprise (2)
WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
The four gentlemen also felt that a company's return on equity ("ROE") was an important measure of its financial strength. The higher the ROE number, the better the job the company's management is doing for the shareholders. To understand what ROE is and what it means to an investor, I'm afraid we will have to look at some accounting principles, but I'll try to keep it as short and simple as possible.
There are a few accounting terms we need to address in order to fully understand the term ROE. Obviously, the most important one is the word, equity. Book Value of the securities issued by a company is the price it received when it sold them to investors in a public offering - not the current market price of those securities. A company's capitalization is the book value of all securities issued by a company: its common stock, any preferred stock and any bonds or other long term debt. Typically, the term capital refers to the book value of a company's issued common stock. Equity means the capital (the common stock book value) plus the company's retained earnings. You may remember that retained earnings are the earnings of a company not paid out in dividends after all expenses have been paid.
Therefore, the Equity of a company is usually smaller than that company's Capitalization, but if the company has operated at a profit in the past, its Equity should be larger than the Capital of the company. ROE is the ratio of the annual earnings of a company divided by its equity, the book value of its common stock plus retained earnings. An individual investor might also compare the ratio of the earnings to the current market price of a stock. Al Frank suggested that a 15% ROE or a 15% return measured against the current price of shares were measures of a potentially good investment.
However, there is one trap in this metric. An individual investor should look for a company with a high ROE whose debt is not excessive. If the equity percentage of the total capitalization of a company is only 10% and the remaining 90% is debt, it would not be hard to have a high ROE. The equity percentage is very small and the company could be viewed as overleveraged. A company worth considering as an investment should have a high ROE (15%-20% or better) based on a significant equity base with moderate debt. One sign of good business management is a high ROE on large equity.
The gentlemen recommended that the individual investor also look for companies with a history of dividend payments (even better if the dividends have been regularly increased) and a history of increasing earnings. By history, they meant at least the last 5 years. As mentioned above, another sign of a well managed company was one with a moderate amount of debt when compared to the company's total capitalization. This means that the earnings of the company can be directed towards increasing the business and paying dividends; not paying interest to lenders. A certain amount of debt is to be expected; but if the company is heavily indebted (significantly more debt than equity), this could presage financial problems for the company during difficult economic times. Given traditional economic cycles, the individual investor must expect some periods of economic stress during his or her investment career. It is during a down economy or recession when truly strong business managers excel and keep their companies on track.
We have now devoted approximately 10 blogs to learning about fundamental analysis from four highly regarded value investors. If what they have to say makes sense to you as an individual investor, I recommend you read at least one of the books from Carret, Graham or Frank to learn more. Regardless of which one you choose (I suggest reading all of them) you should also read, in any event, either the first or the second edition of Lawrence A. Cunningham's collection of Buffett's shareholder letters, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America.
There are two subsets of fundamental value investing: growth investing and contrary investing. We will address those next.
Comments are always welcome.
The four gentlemen also felt that a company's return on equity ("ROE") was an important measure of its financial strength. The higher the ROE number, the better the job the company's management is doing for the shareholders. To understand what ROE is and what it means to an investor, I'm afraid we will have to look at some accounting principles, but I'll try to keep it as short and simple as possible.
There are a few accounting terms we need to address in order to fully understand the term ROE. Obviously, the most important one is the word, equity. Book Value of the securities issued by a company is the price it received when it sold them to investors in a public offering - not the current market price of those securities. A company's capitalization is the book value of all securities issued by a company: its common stock, any preferred stock and any bonds or other long term debt. Typically, the term capital refers to the book value of a company's issued common stock. Equity means the capital (the common stock book value) plus the company's retained earnings. You may remember that retained earnings are the earnings of a company not paid out in dividends after all expenses have been paid.
Therefore, the Equity of a company is usually smaller than that company's Capitalization, but if the company has operated at a profit in the past, its Equity should be larger than the Capital of the company. ROE is the ratio of the annual earnings of a company divided by its equity, the book value of its common stock plus retained earnings. An individual investor might also compare the ratio of the earnings to the current market price of a stock. Al Frank suggested that a 15% ROE or a 15% return measured against the current price of shares were measures of a potentially good investment.
However, there is one trap in this metric. An individual investor should look for a company with a high ROE whose debt is not excessive. If the equity percentage of the total capitalization of a company is only 10% and the remaining 90% is debt, it would not be hard to have a high ROE. The equity percentage is very small and the company could be viewed as overleveraged. A company worth considering as an investment should have a high ROE (15%-20% or better) based on a significant equity base with moderate debt. One sign of good business management is a high ROE on large equity.
The gentlemen recommended that the individual investor also look for companies with a history of dividend payments (even better if the dividends have been regularly increased) and a history of increasing earnings. By history, they meant at least the last 5 years. As mentioned above, another sign of a well managed company was one with a moderate amount of debt when compared to the company's total capitalization. This means that the earnings of the company can be directed towards increasing the business and paying dividends; not paying interest to lenders. A certain amount of debt is to be expected; but if the company is heavily indebted (significantly more debt than equity), this could presage financial problems for the company during difficult economic times. Given traditional economic cycles, the individual investor must expect some periods of economic stress during his or her investment career. It is during a down economy or recession when truly strong business managers excel and keep their companies on track.
We have now devoted approximately 10 blogs to learning about fundamental analysis from four highly regarded value investors. If what they have to say makes sense to you as an individual investor, I recommend you read at least one of the books from Carret, Graham or Frank to learn more. Regardless of which one you choose (I suggest reading all of them) you should also read, in any event, either the first or the second edition of Lawrence A. Cunningham's collection of Buffett's shareholder letters, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America.
There are two subsets of fundamental value investing: growth investing and contrary investing. We will address those next.
Comments are always welcome.
Monday, July 11, 2011
Carrett, Graham, Frank & Buffett - A Reprise (1)
WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
The collective careers of Phillip Carret, Benjamin Graham, Al Frank and Warren Buffet span almost 100 years in the stock market. The similarities among their respective investment strategies are striking. In this and the next blog, I will try to list some of those areas of consensus. A list of those financial attributes on which all four men agreed could be used by an individual investor as a basis for selecting stocks for his or her portfolio based on fundamental value principles.
All four of them invested in companies, not stocks. The first rule was that any investment analysis be conducted in a business like manner. They each ignored what the market crowd said about a stock. They wanted to understand a company's business; the product or service the company provided to its customers and its financial condition. As Warren Buffett told his shareholders, he approached an investment in a publicly traded stock as if he were going to buy the entire company. Carret, Graham and Frank each started their individual stock analyses in much the same way.
Carret, Graham and Frank discussed asset allocation, i.e., the division of an investment portfolio between equities and bonds. In general, they all recommended approximately a 50/50 split between stocks and bonds. You may remember that I mentioned an allocation based on an investor's age in an earlier blog, with the investor's age representing the amount of the portfolio being invested in income producing securities, bonds, and the balance, after subtracting his or her age from 100, in stocks.
Diversification was also recommended by them. Buffett took the counter position, suggesting that an investor concentrate his or her purchases in a small number of stocks. Carret, Graham and Frank recommended diversification with ownership in 10 to 30 different stocks, in a wide range of industries. In my earlier blog on Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator, I mentioned Mr. Frank's rule that no company should represent more than 5% of the total value of an individual's holdings. Following this rule would result in an investor holding at least 20 different stocks, which should be in as many different industries. Buffett agreed with Al Frank on time diversification, i.e., longer holding periods reduce overall market risk. Warren Buffett told his Berkshire Hathaway shareholders that his preferred holding time for an investment was somewhere close to "forever."
Another metric they all mentioned is a stock's price/earnings ratio ("P/E"). A company's P/E is very much like the price per pound for food. The lower the P/E, the cheaper the purchase, regardless of the actual dollar price of the stock. A stock selling for $80 per share with a P/E of 10 is cheaper than a stock selling for $40 per share with a P/E of 15. The actual price for a dollar of earnings is one of the easiest ways to measure what an investor is actually paying for shares. Warren Buffett looks at a company's P/E to see if the company has an "attractive price." Just like the price per pound for hamburger, a P/E reflects how expensive the stock is. The lower the better. However, an individual investor can not just pick stocks with low P/Es, since in some instances the market may have correctly evaluated the company as a bad investment and given it a low P/E ratio. The P/E ratio is only one of several metrics that must be used to find a promising investment.
We will continue with this list of their recommended attributes for an investment in the next blog.
I welcome your comments.
The collective careers of Phillip Carret, Benjamin Graham, Al Frank and Warren Buffet span almost 100 years in the stock market. The similarities among their respective investment strategies are striking. In this and the next blog, I will try to list some of those areas of consensus. A list of those financial attributes on which all four men agreed could be used by an individual investor as a basis for selecting stocks for his or her portfolio based on fundamental value principles.
All four of them invested in companies, not stocks. The first rule was that any investment analysis be conducted in a business like manner. They each ignored what the market crowd said about a stock. They wanted to understand a company's business; the product or service the company provided to its customers and its financial condition. As Warren Buffett told his shareholders, he approached an investment in a publicly traded stock as if he were going to buy the entire company. Carret, Graham and Frank each started their individual stock analyses in much the same way.
Carret, Graham and Frank discussed asset allocation, i.e., the division of an investment portfolio between equities and bonds. In general, they all recommended approximately a 50/50 split between stocks and bonds. You may remember that I mentioned an allocation based on an investor's age in an earlier blog, with the investor's age representing the amount of the portfolio being invested in income producing securities, bonds, and the balance, after subtracting his or her age from 100, in stocks.
Diversification was also recommended by them. Buffett took the counter position, suggesting that an investor concentrate his or her purchases in a small number of stocks. Carret, Graham and Frank recommended diversification with ownership in 10 to 30 different stocks, in a wide range of industries. In my earlier blog on Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator, I mentioned Mr. Frank's rule that no company should represent more than 5% of the total value of an individual's holdings. Following this rule would result in an investor holding at least 20 different stocks, which should be in as many different industries. Buffett agreed with Al Frank on time diversification, i.e., longer holding periods reduce overall market risk. Warren Buffett told his Berkshire Hathaway shareholders that his preferred holding time for an investment was somewhere close to "forever."
Another metric they all mentioned is a stock's price/earnings ratio ("P/E"). A company's P/E is very much like the price per pound for food. The lower the P/E, the cheaper the purchase, regardless of the actual dollar price of the stock. A stock selling for $80 per share with a P/E of 10 is cheaper than a stock selling for $40 per share with a P/E of 15. The actual price for a dollar of earnings is one of the easiest ways to measure what an investor is actually paying for shares. Warren Buffett looks at a company's P/E to see if the company has an "attractive price." Just like the price per pound for hamburger, a P/E reflects how expensive the stock is. The lower the better. However, an individual investor can not just pick stocks with low P/Es, since in some instances the market may have correctly evaluated the company as a bad investment and given it a low P/E ratio. The P/E ratio is only one of several metrics that must be used to find a promising investment.
We will continue with this list of their recommended attributes for an investment in the next blog.
I welcome your comments.
Monday, July 4, 2011
Warren Buffett
WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
If there were a Mount Rushmore for investment greats, Warren Buffett's face would surely be depicted. A student of Benjamin Graham, Mr. Buffett started out his investment career in Omaha, Nebraska. He never left and,over 50+ years, shrewdly invested in stocks, bonds and insurance companies. He made himself a multi billionaire and many of his early investors multimillionaires.
Mr. Buffett's company, Berkshire Hathaway, is the vehicle through which he makes his investments. It is publicly traded and could be viewed as a gigantic mutual fund run by one of the most successful fund managers in history. Ironically, the name of the company comes from one of his early investment mistakes, a New England textile manufacturer which he liquidated after many years of financial struggle. He admits that this investment was based, in large part, on his early investment style; the one he learned from Benjamin Graham - buying companies as cheaply as possible. Sometimes companies are cheap because they should be, not because the market has mistakenly undervalued them. These days Mr. Buffett says he looks for investments with an "attractive price."
Unlike most fund managers on Wall Street, Mr. Buffett has the majority of his wealth invested in his company. The company's results have the same effect on him as on his investors, i.e., he "eats what he cooks." By living in Omaha, he also avoids the "group think" so common on Wall Street. He explained this by recounting a story from Mr. Graham:
Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. "You're qualified for residence:, said St. Peter, "but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There's no way to squeeze you in." After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, "Oil discovered in hell." Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. "No," he said, "I think I'll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all."
There have been a multitude of books written about Warren Buffett, his life and his investment strategy. The best way to learn his value investing methods is to read his annual letter to the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, the first of which was written in 1977. As with Philip Carret's book, The Art of Speculation, these letters provide an "at the time" history of what was going on then in the financial world. An individual investor interested in value investing could not do much better than to read these letters and, in effect, learn from the master. On the right side of this blog site is a link to those letters on the Berkshire website.
An even easier way to learn how Buffett thinks is to read The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, an authorized compilation of material from the shareholder letters edited by Lawrence A. Cunningham. The first edition was published in 2001, and a second edition came out in 2008. His writing style is professional and his humor self deprecating. I look forward to reading his new letter each year and often reread them to refresh my ideas on investments.
I can not add to the volumes of information on Mr. Buffett, so I'll stop here. In our next blog, I will try to coalesce the value investment strategies of Phillip Carrett, Benjamin Graham, Al Frank and Warren Buffet.
Comments are always welcome.
If there were a Mount Rushmore for investment greats, Warren Buffett's face would surely be depicted. A student of Benjamin Graham, Mr. Buffett started out his investment career in Omaha, Nebraska. He never left and,over 50+ years, shrewdly invested in stocks, bonds and insurance companies. He made himself a multi billionaire and many of his early investors multimillionaires.
Mr. Buffett's company, Berkshire Hathaway, is the vehicle through which he makes his investments. It is publicly traded and could be viewed as a gigantic mutual fund run by one of the most successful fund managers in history. Ironically, the name of the company comes from one of his early investment mistakes, a New England textile manufacturer which he liquidated after many years of financial struggle. He admits that this investment was based, in large part, on his early investment style; the one he learned from Benjamin Graham - buying companies as cheaply as possible. Sometimes companies are cheap because they should be, not because the market has mistakenly undervalued them. These days Mr. Buffett says he looks for investments with an "attractive price."
Unlike most fund managers on Wall Street, Mr. Buffett has the majority of his wealth invested in his company. The company's results have the same effect on him as on his investors, i.e., he "eats what he cooks." By living in Omaha, he also avoids the "group think" so common on Wall Street. He explained this by recounting a story from Mr. Graham:
Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. "You're qualified for residence:, said St. Peter, "but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There's no way to squeeze you in." After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, "Oil discovered in hell." Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. "No," he said, "I think I'll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all."
There have been a multitude of books written about Warren Buffett, his life and his investment strategy. The best way to learn his value investing methods is to read his annual letter to the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, the first of which was written in 1977. As with Philip Carret's book, The Art of Speculation, these letters provide an "at the time" history of what was going on then in the financial world. An individual investor interested in value investing could not do much better than to read these letters and, in effect, learn from the master. On the right side of this blog site is a link to those letters on the Berkshire website.
An even easier way to learn how Buffett thinks is to read The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, an authorized compilation of material from the shareholder letters edited by Lawrence A. Cunningham. The first edition was published in 2001, and a second edition came out in 2008. His writing style is professional and his humor self deprecating. I look forward to reading his new letter each year and often reread them to refresh my ideas on investments.
I can not add to the volumes of information on Mr. Buffett, so I'll stop here. In our next blog, I will try to coalesce the value investment strategies of Phillip Carrett, Benjamin Graham, Al Frank and Warren Buffet.
Comments are always welcome.
Monday, June 27, 2011
Al Frank (4)
WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
In addition to stock diversification, Al Frank also discussed time diversification, i.e., how long does an investor hold a stock he or she has purchased. In these days of split second trades conducted by extremely fast computer programs, such an idea seems old fashioned. Since few individual investors have the financial resources, time or ability to set up a computer programmed investment system for successful trading in and out of the market every minute, I believe the old fashioned way of investing is still relevant and preferable for the individual investor. Mr. Frank discussed diversification as follows:
Diversification refers to stocks, industries and time. Stock diversification is the spreading of individual stocks and corporate risk by obtaining as many different stocks in different industries as is reasonable and feasible with one's resources. Time diversification is the holding of positions for as long as their fundamental analyses indicate their undervaluation and potential appreciation, because studies have shown market risk is thereby reduced. Few investors seem aware that time diversification is more important than stock diversification. Generally the longer you own a stock (of a viable business) the less risk you engender.
Mr. Frank wrote about a study published in the Journal of Portfolio Management, which measured the reduction of risk achieved by holding stocks for longer periods of time. The study had the following results:
Testing portfolios varying in size from 1 to 100 stocks, with holding periods from six months to six years, "[The researchers] concluded that a 1-stock 'portfolio' held for one year was less risky than a 100-stock portfolio held for a single six-month period." The authors also found that holding a 10-stock portfolio for four years was one-third as risky as holding a 100-stock portfolio for one year. There is a common sense rationale for the statistical probabilities of time diversification. For any relatively brief period, the market can have a selloff that carries most stocks down without regard to each of their corporation's fundamentals. This is called market or systematic risk. But over longer time periods, the aphorism "Value will out" tends to prove true.
In order to hold a stock for a long time, the investor must have a very important trait: patience. He or she must have the patience to weather the ups and downs of the market and to continue holding a stock despite its short term movements. To have the necessary patience, the investor must believe in a system of investing. Patience is only possible if the individual has confidence in his or her chosen investment strategy. Mr. Frank summed it up as follows:
Maintaining our analytic methodology, portfolio strategy, and steadfast patience even though some of our stocks or the market in general takes a tumble are practical applications of rule utilitarianism. When you believe in your system, in the long-term advancing nature of undervalued stocks and the market on average, then you are able to hold an undervalued stock through its recurring downward fluctuations in market price, even through a 50 percent or more decline in price. In this regard, Buffet has pointed out that, "You ignore that possibility at your own peril. In the history of almost every major company in this country, it has happened. you shouldn't own common stocks if a decrease in their value by 50 percent would cause you to feel stress."
We will end our review of Mr. Frank's classic text on this note. We will return to his book in the future since he also explains other investment strategies, but he remained committed to value investing as his core philosophy.
The material from Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator by Al Frank, copyright 1995 by Al Frank, is used with permission of the copyright holders, the heirs of Al Frank.
Your comments are welcome and will be posted upon receipt.
In addition to stock diversification, Al Frank also discussed time diversification, i.e., how long does an investor hold a stock he or she has purchased. In these days of split second trades conducted by extremely fast computer programs, such an idea seems old fashioned. Since few individual investors have the financial resources, time or ability to set up a computer programmed investment system for successful trading in and out of the market every minute, I believe the old fashioned way of investing is still relevant and preferable for the individual investor. Mr. Frank discussed diversification as follows:
Diversification refers to stocks, industries and time. Stock diversification is the spreading of individual stocks and corporate risk by obtaining as many different stocks in different industries as is reasonable and feasible with one's resources. Time diversification is the holding of positions for as long as their fundamental analyses indicate their undervaluation and potential appreciation, because studies have shown market risk is thereby reduced. Few investors seem aware that time diversification is more important than stock diversification. Generally the longer you own a stock (of a viable business) the less risk you engender.
Mr. Frank wrote about a study published in the Journal of Portfolio Management, which measured the reduction of risk achieved by holding stocks for longer periods of time. The study had the following results:
Testing portfolios varying in size from 1 to 100 stocks, with holding periods from six months to six years, "[The researchers] concluded that a 1-stock 'portfolio' held for one year was less risky than a 100-stock portfolio held for a single six-month period." The authors also found that holding a 10-stock portfolio for four years was one-third as risky as holding a 100-stock portfolio for one year. There is a common sense rationale for the statistical probabilities of time diversification. For any relatively brief period, the market can have a selloff that carries most stocks down without regard to each of their corporation's fundamentals. This is called market or systematic risk. But over longer time periods, the aphorism "Value will out" tends to prove true.
In order to hold a stock for a long time, the investor must have a very important trait: patience. He or she must have the patience to weather the ups and downs of the market and to continue holding a stock despite its short term movements. To have the necessary patience, the investor must believe in a system of investing. Patience is only possible if the individual has confidence in his or her chosen investment strategy. Mr. Frank summed it up as follows:
Maintaining our analytic methodology, portfolio strategy, and steadfast patience even though some of our stocks or the market in general takes a tumble are practical applications of rule utilitarianism. When you believe in your system, in the long-term advancing nature of undervalued stocks and the market on average, then you are able to hold an undervalued stock through its recurring downward fluctuations in market price, even through a 50 percent or more decline in price. In this regard, Buffet has pointed out that, "You ignore that possibility at your own peril. In the history of almost every major company in this country, it has happened. you shouldn't own common stocks if a decrease in their value by 50 percent would cause you to feel stress."
We will end our review of Mr. Frank's classic text on this note. We will return to his book in the future since he also explains other investment strategies, but he remained committed to value investing as his core philosophy.
The material from Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator by Al Frank, copyright 1995 by Al Frank, is used with permission of the copyright holders, the heirs of Al Frank.
Your comments are welcome and will be posted upon receipt.
Monday, June 20, 2011
Al Frank (3)
WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
We ended the last blog with Mr. Frank's comments on diversification; i.e., not putting all of your eggs in one basket. This mirrors the advice of the other authors we have looked at, Philip Carret and Benjamin Graham. Al Frank stated that there are actually two types of diversification which the individual investor has to keep in mind. In his book, Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator, he discussed the concept of diversification as follows:
There are two distinct schools of portfolio construction and management which can be summarized by the terms concentration and diversification. Those who favor concentration believe in owning relatively few stocks at any one time. Instead of putting many eggs in many baskets, the concentrationists put a few eggs in one basket. They are very careful in the initial selection process, because if they are wrong in even one stock the impact on their equity would be significantly detrimental. Some of them also believe that few can adequately analyze and understand more than a handful of corporations, let alone keep sufficient tabs on them after buying them.
Mr. Frank identified Gerald Loeb and Warren Buffet, two famous investors, as proponents of concentrated investing. Although he obviously respected their investing track records, he did not agree with them. He explained his position as follows:
In contrast to these estimable and successful gentlemen, I am a firm believer in diversification - almost the wider the better - in order to minimize individual corporate risk sometimes called unsystematic risk (as contrasted to market or systematic risk). Even before I learned about risk reduction from diversification, I had an intuitive or common sense notion that if you only had a small percentage of your estate at risk in any one position, and if that position went against you badly, then you wouldn't be hurt much overall. My initial sense of stock diversification was that I'd want at least 30 stocks, because 30 was the number that elementary statistics texts claim is a minimum meaningful population or number of events. I find it interesting that my original, naive choice of having at least 30 stocks would turn out statistically to eliminate about 96 percent of individual stock risk.
Mr. Frank went on to warn his readers that just buying any 30 stocks was not the end of the exercise. Those stocks had to also be in different industries; industries that did not, as a group, perform in similar ways in the market. As an example, the oil exploration industry and the oil refining industry are connected for obvious reasons. Economic events in the world will affect both industries in much the same way. Indeed, events in one industry will have direct economic effects on the other. Therefore, to own the stock of Exxon Mobil, the oil exploration giant, and also of Valero Energy Corporation, one of the largest oil refiners in the US, does not mean that the investor has achieved any meaningful diversification. Although they are two separate companies, the fortunes of the global oil industry will impact them both at the same time. Mr. Frank recommended an individual investor hold 30 stocks in at least 12 to 15 different industry groups in his or her portfolio. An individual investor, when starting out, will not be able to immediately achieve this level of diversification, but can manage his or her portfolio over time to meet this level of stock diversity.
Mr. Frank also counseled that no individual stock in an investor's portfolio should exceed 5% of the portfolio's total value. This rule is applied very easily to the investor's stock purchases when embarking on his or her investing career. What this means is that the investor's initial goal would be to accumulate a minimum of 20 different stocks in almost as many different industries. Once the investor's portfolio has been established, then the rule is applied with each subsequent purchase. The 5% rule is really a simple way to maintain diversification. If one stock grows in value to the point that it is overweighted in the portfolio, this is a sign that the investor should consider selling some of the position in order to regain portfolio balance. He suggested the following:
Applying only to initial purchases, the 5 percent rule is waived in the case of appreciated stocks that are still significantly undervalued according to their fundamental corporate analysis. I suggest you consider a 10 to 20 percent limit of any appreciated position in your portfolio. The idea is to avoid the chance of being badly damaged if one or a few positions go sour, and if your "best stock" begins to represent more than 15 percent, a sharp (50 percent) drop in it would really set back the portfolio's overall performance. Besides, you don't have to sell all or even most of the highly appreciated stock - just bring it down to 10 percent or less of the portfolio and reinvest the proceeds in other undervalued stocks, thus increasing stock diversification.
Mr. Frank also wrote about a second type of diversification in investing, i.e., time diversification. We will investigate his concept in next week's blog.
The material from Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator by Al Frank, copyright 1995 by Al Frank, is used with permission of the copyright holders, the heirs of Al Frank.
Please feel free to leave a comment, which will be promptly posted to the site.
We ended the last blog with Mr. Frank's comments on diversification; i.e., not putting all of your eggs in one basket. This mirrors the advice of the other authors we have looked at, Philip Carret and Benjamin Graham. Al Frank stated that there are actually two types of diversification which the individual investor has to keep in mind. In his book, Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator, he discussed the concept of diversification as follows:
There are two distinct schools of portfolio construction and management which can be summarized by the terms concentration and diversification. Those who favor concentration believe in owning relatively few stocks at any one time. Instead of putting many eggs in many baskets, the concentrationists put a few eggs in one basket. They are very careful in the initial selection process, because if they are wrong in even one stock the impact on their equity would be significantly detrimental. Some of them also believe that few can adequately analyze and understand more than a handful of corporations, let alone keep sufficient tabs on them after buying them.
Mr. Frank identified Gerald Loeb and Warren Buffet, two famous investors, as proponents of concentrated investing. Although he obviously respected their investing track records, he did not agree with them. He explained his position as follows:
In contrast to these estimable and successful gentlemen, I am a firm believer in diversification - almost the wider the better - in order to minimize individual corporate risk sometimes called unsystematic risk (as contrasted to market or systematic risk). Even before I learned about risk reduction from diversification, I had an intuitive or common sense notion that if you only had a small percentage of your estate at risk in any one position, and if that position went against you badly, then you wouldn't be hurt much overall. My initial sense of stock diversification was that I'd want at least 30 stocks, because 30 was the number that elementary statistics texts claim is a minimum meaningful population or number of events. I find it interesting that my original, naive choice of having at least 30 stocks would turn out statistically to eliminate about 96 percent of individual stock risk.
Mr. Frank went on to warn his readers that just buying any 30 stocks was not the end of the exercise. Those stocks had to also be in different industries; industries that did not, as a group, perform in similar ways in the market. As an example, the oil exploration industry and the oil refining industry are connected for obvious reasons. Economic events in the world will affect both industries in much the same way. Indeed, events in one industry will have direct economic effects on the other. Therefore, to own the stock of Exxon Mobil, the oil exploration giant, and also of Valero Energy Corporation, one of the largest oil refiners in the US, does not mean that the investor has achieved any meaningful diversification. Although they are two separate companies, the fortunes of the global oil industry will impact them both at the same time. Mr. Frank recommended an individual investor hold 30 stocks in at least 12 to 15 different industry groups in his or her portfolio. An individual investor, when starting out, will not be able to immediately achieve this level of diversification, but can manage his or her portfolio over time to meet this level of stock diversity.
Mr. Frank also counseled that no individual stock in an investor's portfolio should exceed 5% of the portfolio's total value. This rule is applied very easily to the investor's stock purchases when embarking on his or her investing career. What this means is that the investor's initial goal would be to accumulate a minimum of 20 different stocks in almost as many different industries. Once the investor's portfolio has been established, then the rule is applied with each subsequent purchase. The 5% rule is really a simple way to maintain diversification. If one stock grows in value to the point that it is overweighted in the portfolio, this is a sign that the investor should consider selling some of the position in order to regain portfolio balance. He suggested the following:
Applying only to initial purchases, the 5 percent rule is waived in the case of appreciated stocks that are still significantly undervalued according to their fundamental corporate analysis. I suggest you consider a 10 to 20 percent limit of any appreciated position in your portfolio. The idea is to avoid the chance of being badly damaged if one or a few positions go sour, and if your "best stock" begins to represent more than 15 percent, a sharp (50 percent) drop in it would really set back the portfolio's overall performance. Besides, you don't have to sell all or even most of the highly appreciated stock - just bring it down to 10 percent or less of the portfolio and reinvest the proceeds in other undervalued stocks, thus increasing stock diversification.
Mr. Frank also wrote about a second type of diversification in investing, i.e., time diversification. We will investigate his concept in next week's blog.
The material from Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator by Al Frank, copyright 1995 by Al Frank, is used with permission of the copyright holders, the heirs of Al Frank.
Please feel free to leave a comment, which will be promptly posted to the site.
Monday, June 13, 2011
Al Frank (2)
WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BLOG, IS NOW WALL STREET SMARTS, THE BOOK. FULLY EDITED AND REVISED WITH NEW MATERIAL ON AMAZON
One of the things I like about Al Frank's book, Al Frank's New Prudent Investor, is his repeated emphasis of the fact that investing need not be difficult. Wall Street perpetuates the myth that it takes advanced degrees, a genius IQ and esoteric analysis of all sorts of business minutiae in order to succeed in the market. He argued against that as follows:
There is no limit to the amount of inquiry and effort analysts can expend evaluating a corporation, but it is not necessary to go into great or subtle detail. A selection of relatively gross measures is usually sufficient to make such evaluations and selections for successful stock speculation.
Mr. Frank listed seven criteria which he felt were good indicators of a corporation whose stock merited consideration. He listed them as follows:
1. Price to earnings (P/E). Normally, industrial stocks trading below 10 times earnings to 30 percent below their P/E norm (average P/E).
2. Price to sales or revenues (P/R). Normally, stocks trading near their out-of-favor levels or below their accepted P/R levels.
3. Price to book value (P/BV). Normally, stocks trading below their book value per share of 30 percent below their book value norm.
4. Price to cash flow (P/CF). Normally, stocks trading at less than six times cash flow or 30 percent below their cash flow norm.
5. Return on equity or net worth (ROE). Normally, stocks trading at a 15 percent return on equity or better. (Likewise a return of 15 percent or better on the cost of shares).
6. Market capitalization (market cap). Normally, stocks with a market capitalization of less than $200 million (computed as shares outstanding times price per share) are considered "small cap." While returns on small company stocks (below $100 million in market cap) are significant over long time periods, I tend to buy bargains in value and growth of any size market-capitalization stock, especially as a mix can aid diversification (risk reduction) for those periods when large-cap stocks outperform small-cap stocks.
7. Return on assets (ROA). Normally stocks trading for an ROA comparable to or higher than their historical ROA, although somewhat lower ROAs in stocks found to be otherwise undervalued may indicate room for improvement. Pay attention to the trend of this component, as well as in all the other criteria.
When referencing an "average" ratio, its "norm" or the ratio's "accepted level", Mr. Frank means the average for that criteria for the previous 5 years. This means an investor might have to do some digging, but it is worth the effort. Looking at a 5 year average for a company's financial metrics minimizes the effect of what would be an abnormal ratio for a company due to any unusual economic or financial forces currently affecting it.
Mr. Frank was also a strong proponent of diversification, as reflected in his comment in criteria number 6 above. Like Carret and Graham, he recommended a portfolio with a number of stocks. He had the following to say about diversification:
I want to be widely diversified with many different stocks from several industries in my portfolio. I want to have at least 25 or preferably 35 or more stocks in 15 to 17 different industries in a portfolio, so that when 5 or 10 stocks underperform, that result is offset by the good performance of the 15 or 25 others.
We will continue with Mr. Frank in the next blog.
The material from Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator by Al Frank, copyright 1995 by Al Frank, is used with permission of the copyright holders, the heirs of Al Frank.
Your comments are welcome and will be posted upon receipt.
One of the things I like about Al Frank's book, Al Frank's New Prudent Investor, is his repeated emphasis of the fact that investing need not be difficult. Wall Street perpetuates the myth that it takes advanced degrees, a genius IQ and esoteric analysis of all sorts of business minutiae in order to succeed in the market. He argued against that as follows:
There is no limit to the amount of inquiry and effort analysts can expend evaluating a corporation, but it is not necessary to go into great or subtle detail. A selection of relatively gross measures is usually sufficient to make such evaluations and selections for successful stock speculation.
Mr. Frank listed seven criteria which he felt were good indicators of a corporation whose stock merited consideration. He listed them as follows:
1. Price to earnings (P/E). Normally, industrial stocks trading below 10 times earnings to 30 percent below their P/E norm (average P/E).
2. Price to sales or revenues (P/R). Normally, stocks trading near their out-of-favor levels or below their accepted P/R levels.
3. Price to book value (P/BV). Normally, stocks trading below their book value per share of 30 percent below their book value norm.
4. Price to cash flow (P/CF). Normally, stocks trading at less than six times cash flow or 30 percent below their cash flow norm.
5. Return on equity or net worth (ROE). Normally, stocks trading at a 15 percent return on equity or better. (Likewise a return of 15 percent or better on the cost of shares).
6. Market capitalization (market cap). Normally, stocks with a market capitalization of less than $200 million (computed as shares outstanding times price per share) are considered "small cap." While returns on small company stocks (below $100 million in market cap) are significant over long time periods, I tend to buy bargains in value and growth of any size market-capitalization stock, especially as a mix can aid diversification (risk reduction) for those periods when large-cap stocks outperform small-cap stocks.
7. Return on assets (ROA). Normally stocks trading for an ROA comparable to or higher than their historical ROA, although somewhat lower ROAs in stocks found to be otherwise undervalued may indicate room for improvement. Pay attention to the trend of this component, as well as in all the other criteria.
When referencing an "average" ratio, its "norm" or the ratio's "accepted level", Mr. Frank means the average for that criteria for the previous 5 years. This means an investor might have to do some digging, but it is worth the effort. Looking at a 5 year average for a company's financial metrics minimizes the effect of what would be an abnormal ratio for a company due to any unusual economic or financial forces currently affecting it.
Mr. Frank was also a strong proponent of diversification, as reflected in his comment in criteria number 6 above. Like Carret and Graham, he recommended a portfolio with a number of stocks. He had the following to say about diversification:
I want to be widely diversified with many different stocks from several industries in my portfolio. I want to have at least 25 or preferably 35 or more stocks in 15 to 17 different industries in a portfolio, so that when 5 or 10 stocks underperform, that result is offset by the good performance of the 15 or 25 others.
We will continue with Mr. Frank in the next blog.
The material from Al Frank's New Prudent Speculator by Al Frank, copyright 1995 by Al Frank, is used with permission of the copyright holders, the heirs of Al Frank.
Your comments are welcome and will be posted upon receipt.
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